

The Mellon Foundation's Sawyer Seminar Series

**Crisis, what Crisis? Collapses and Dark
Ages in Comparative Perspective
An International Conference**

McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research

24-26th September 2010

ABSTRACTS



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James Barrett Introduction

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10.00-11.00 Carole Crumley Crafting tools to examine "Collapse": Global-scale complex adaptive systems and the archaeology of equality

11.00 COFFEE

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11.30-12.15 Colin Renfrew Comparing recessions: System collapse as a general category

12.15-13.00 Alf Hornborg Defining 'complexity' in collapsing societies: The imperative of acknowledging the role of fetishism and cultural specificity in societal decline

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14.00-14.45 Norman Yoffee Crises in Mesopotamia?

14.45-15.30 Miroslav Bárta The rise and fall of an Empire: Egyptian Old Kingdom in a diachronic perspective (2700-2150 B.C.)

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11.00-11.45 Cameron Petrie Differentiating collapse from transformation by investigating human and environment interactions between the decline of Indus urbanism to the appearance of the Early Historic cities in South Asia

11.45-12.30 Poul Holm Perfect storms: Dark Ages compared

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13.30-14.45 Martin Millett and James Gerrard The end of Roman Britain and the anatomy of a crisis

14.45-15.30 Lotte Hedeager Attila and the recast of Scandinavia

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16.00-16.45 James Barrett What, where, when: Collapse in Viking Age Europe?

16.45-17.30 John Hatcher The Long 14th Century - A review

17.45 RECEPTION

SUNDAY 26 SEPTEMBER

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- 9.00-9.45 Atholl Anderson Crises of inequality in Maori prehistory and tradition
9.45-10.30 David Beresford-Jones The collapse of Nasca on the south coast of Peru: View from new perspectives

10.30 COFFEE

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- 11.00-11.45 Randall McGuire Abandoning collapse in the history of the Hohokam of Southern Arizona.
11.45-12.30 Elizabeth Graham 'Maya Collapse': What Crisis? Whose Collapse?

12.30 DISCUSSION

Chair: James Barrett

13.00 LUNCH

Crafting tools to examine “Collapse”: Global-scale complex adaptive systems and the archaeology of equality

Carole L. Crumley (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill crumley@email.unc.edu)

Tool and die makers produce fixtures, dies, molds and gauges used in the manufacturing process. While many objects in the current archaeological toolbox (e.g. concepts, skills, scales) serve us well for examining the past, current challenges to human well-being require archaeologists to analyze complex adaptive systems that include human agency at broad scales of time and space. Long, slow processes interact with more rapid changes to transform societies; harmonic interactions among ‘drivers’ inflect the archaeological record. Of the areas of slow change that need attention, I focus on two: trends in conjoined human and environmental history, and styles of political power.

Some environmental changes, such as volcanic activity, occur rapidly; other changes occur gradually and have variable, elusive effects, such as warming or cooling trends that manifest over a few human generations or a few hundreds of years. How can the role of environmental change be evaluated in explaining social, political and economic shifts? What tools are appropriate for clarifying these complex interactions?

The archaeological study of power relations has focused on the rise of inequality — ‘peaks’ in a power landscape — in great part because inequality leaves relatively clear evidence, leading directly to a certain obsession with the circumstances of collapse. However, the search for a resilient and secure future for our species calls for an understanding of the circumstances that favour ‘gentle hills’ (polycentric) and more homogenous ‘plateau’ (egalitarian) political landscapes. What tools are needed to detect shifts toward or away from equality and the circumstances of their appearance?

There is intriguing evidence that equitable, collaborative frameworks of governance are more resilient to systemic shocks. How can archaeologists test this assertion?

Comparing recessions: System collapse as a general category

Colin Renfrew (University of Cambridge: acr10@cam.ac.uk)

It is open to question whether system collapse is a valid general category. Clearly there are some natural disasters with devastating local consequences: the Minoan eruption of the Santorini volcano, like the Plinian eruption of Vesuvius, is a case in point. But if we except these sudden natural disasters, the most striking feature of so-called ‘Dark Ages’ is the loss of information which can readily be recovered by posterity. The phenomenon is often simply little more than the temporary loss of literacy.

It will be argued that many of the most notable ‘Dark Ages’ are simply episodes where the few specialists formerly involved in the production of written records cease, for a while, to keep going. This is the common factor which links the Maya, the Mycenaean, and the British post-Roman ‘Dark Ages’.

Clearly there are circumstances where complex societies, often stratified societies, experience some economic decline. One response can be an increasing investment in symbolic behaviour, of a kind which can promote a sudden termination rather than a gradual decline. But these are rarely identified as ‘Dark Ages’ by posterity unless there has indeed been a loss of literacy.

Defining ‘complexity’ in collapsing societies: The imperative of acknowledging the role of fetishism and cultural specificity in societal decline

Alf Hornborg (Lund University: alf.hornborg@humecol.lu.se)

In *The Collapse of Complex Societies*, Joseph Tainter persuasively argues that societies collapse when they suffer from declining returns on investments in complexity. This account has the advantage of being applicable to the wide range of past societies where overinvestment in some particular kind of infrastructure (e.g., Roman armies, Mayan temples, Easter Island statues) is conventionally viewed as a factor contributing to

their decline. In suggesting that specific cultural strategies for problem-solving can recursively aggravate the problems – whether e.g., military, political, ideological, or ecological challenges – and generate vicious downhill circles, Tainter’s explanation is intellectually appealing. Moreover, it prompts us to scrutinize escalating investments in technological infrastructure (e.g., for transports, environmental protection, medical care, social rehabilitation, etc.) in modern societies. In contrast with more superficial accounts such as Jared Diamond’s *Collapse* or Sing Chew’s *Dark Ages*, Tainter also dedramatizes processes of societal decline by observing that collapses or 'Dark Ages' have rarely been as calamitous as historiographers tend to imagine. This conclusion was recently underscored by Patricia McAnany and Norman Yoffee in their edited collection *Questioning Collapse*. But regardless of the contested issue of the scope of human suffering, the recurrent phenomenon of societal decline deserves theoretically and empirically well-informed elucidation. Tainter’s formalist model needs to be complemented with close, case-by-case attention to the cultural specificity of each such counterproductive strategy for solving problems. In addition to the mathematical abstraction of curves depicting the 'marginal productivity' of different kinds of societal investments, we need to understand how idiosyncratic and unpredictable cultural conceptions about the nature of the world can represent specific material infrastructures (such as temples or monolithic statues) as technologies that are indispensable for human survival. If we are lucky, such insights might help us expose those specific varieties of fetishism that may be pushing modern capitalist society itself toward a downhill slope. This is not to suggest an abandonment of formalist models, however. Beyond such cultural specificities we can certainly discern abstract regularities over the millennia, as processes of capital accumulation, unequal exchange, and environmental load displacement generate recurrent socio-ecological polarizations that lead to crisis, contradiction, and decline. At this level of analysis, Tainter’s model can usefully be integrated with approaches rooted in world-system analysis.

Crises in Mesopotamia ?

Norman Yoffee (University of Michigan: nyoffee@umich.edu)

There were many crises in Mesopotamia, if by 'crisis' one means that political systems (of kings and dynasties) were assailed by external enemies and by internal rivals and were toppled. Indeed, in the early history of Mesopotamia, territorial states were conspicuous by their evanescence, dynasties lasted only a few generations, and city-states regularly re-established their local autonomy. If you were a Mesopotamian king, any Mesopotamian king, you faced crises at every turn.

However, new dynasties, often led by 'ethnic group' leaders, mainly denoted by their non-Sumerian, non-Akkadian personal names, seem to have changed the cultural 'core'—Mesopotamian literature, the school tradition, belief system—very little. Rather, these 'new' people tended to patronize scribal schools, adopt and in some cases emphasize archaic language use, and significantly, did not write in their own languages.

In the first millennium BC, Assyrian kings and the mighty Assyrian army, which conquered and ruled much of West Asia, systematically eroded the traditional Assyrian political, social, and economic structure. When a final crisis occurred, that is, when Median and Babylonian defeated the Assyrian army, there was little left of 'Assyrian-ness' and no reconstruction of Assyria was possible. Babylonia, conquered by the superior forces of Cyrus of Persia, was allowed to follow its own gods, and some Babylonians profited by 'exploiting' absentee Persian owners and the cleavage planes in the Persian imperial system. Crises of social orientation— which identity to privilege—characterize several centuries of late Babylonian history.

So, what is normative in the political life of Mesopotamian states? In what senses are 'crises' defined by modern Mesopotamian historians who often seem to believe the propaganda of Mesopotamian kings (and their royal inscriptions) more than any Mesopotamian of the past would have done? How would a non-royal, non-elite Mesopotamian have viewed the crises of their states?

The rise and fall of an Empire: Egyptian Old Kingdom in a diachronic perspective (2700-2150 B.C.)

Miroslav Bárta (Charles University, Prague: Miroslav.Barta@ff.cuni.cz)

Egyptologists traditionally consider the era of the pyramid builders of the Old Kingdom (2700–2150 B.C.) as a rather monolithic and static period which was for the most part of her existence devoid of any significant changes. As a consequence, the demise of the Old Kingdom period has usually been explained as a sudden toppling of the centralistic state. This approach has been modified in the last twenty years or so. Now it becomes clear that major factors that contributed to the demise of the Old Kingdom state were of socio-economic nature. At the same time, it was these factors that originally instigated an unparalleled rise of the kingdom around 2700 B.C.

Today it is possible to demonstrate that mostly identical, originally positive factors that led to the evolution of the society and state during the first dynasties eventually caused the collapse of the same state. At the same time, it becomes clear that several critical factors started to influence the efficiency of the state as early as during the Fifth Dynasty. This long-term decline was during the Sixth Dynasty sped up by a critical worsening of climatic conditions.

It will be also demonstrated that this development was not linear but rather “punctuated” and that long periods of stasis were followed by quick and cumulated changes.

Crises, collapses and Dark Ages: Reading the linguistic signs

Paul Heggarty (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig: paul.heggarty@gmail.com)

'Crisis, what crisis?' To one discipline in the study of prehistory, it seems a bitter irony to imagine that the question even needs asking. Few cultural traits are so intrinsic to our identities as the native languages we speak, yet the linguistic record of our past is littered with instances of the ultimate language crisis: extinction. Most recently, vast swathes of humanity's linguistic heritage and diversity — almost all native languages of the entire Americas and Australia, for instance — have vanished (or very shortly will). This is a direct and unmistakable linguistic correlate to the devastating impacts of European contact on the populations that spoke those languages: demographic, political, social and cultural collapses.

That said, that cross-disciplinary comparisons are by no means necessarily straightforward. For a start, linguists would perhaps not even define crises, collapses and 'Dark Ages' with the same terms and criteria as archaeologists or historians. But while our data and methods may differ, by the same token they complement each other towards our common ultimate goal of understanding the past. Languages make for a sensitive bellwether of upheavals in the societies that speak them, and as such, a valuable source of data and inferences about our past.

To gain this additional linguistic perspective on collapses, this paper first looks to the relatively well-known (pre-)histories of Near East and Europe. Their tumultuous linguistic records duly bear witness to the upheavals that repeatedly shattered the coherence of societies (or 'speaker populations') and their linguistic continuity through time, as 'Dark Ages' of linguistic fragmentation are interspersed between successive waves of expansion that redraw and consolidate the linguistic maps again. The linguistic history of the British Isles, in particular, serves as an 'ice-core' record of the string of impacts, invasions and collapses that shaped our languages, from the retreat of Rome's legions to the Irish potato famine.

On the strength of these corroborated histories in the Old World, we can proceed to pre-history elsewhere, illustrated here for Andean civilisation (particularly Nazca). The linguistic record of the region can be harnessed to provide confident reconstructions and inferences as to the nature, scale, strength and directionality of cross-cultural divergence and convergence impacts. Not that the lessons lie in over simplistic assumptions as to analogies and correlations between the disciplines. Rather, it is from careful, informed analysis of the details in language data that one can discern a range of discrete signals relevant to (pre-)historians. The contrasts between language extinctions, substrate or superstrate impacts, for instance, represent potential linguistic diagnostics as to the different forms and severity of collapses: from significant demographic impacts to cases of 'elite dominance', whose linguistic import is often overstated and misunderstood.

Desertification and cultural collapse in arid lands: Are they synonymous?

Graeme Barker (University of Cambridge: gb314@cam.ac.uk)

With the benefit of its long timescales, archaeology has the potential to contribute importantly to understanding the causes and consequences of 'desertification', processes of land degradation in arid and semi-arid lands. When was landscape degradation caused by climatic deterioration or human agency, or by both factors in tandem? Did desertification always spell disaster for the human societies caught up in it? Given that one third of the world's population lives in arid and semi-arid environments, and global warming is likely to make these environments increasingly difficult to live in, such questions about desertification history are not just of academic interest. The paper reflects on the findings of an inter-disciplinary investigation by a team of archaeologists, geographers, historians, and anthropologists of the long-term landscape history of the Wadi Faynan in southern Jordan, regarding the complexity of desertification processes, and of cultural responses to it, over the past 7000 years.

Differentiating collapse from transformation by investigating human and environment interactions between the decline of Indus urbanism to the appearance of the Early Historic cities in South Asia

Cameron Petrie (University of Cambridge: cap59@cam.ac.uk)

Archaeologists and geographers have long debated the possible link between environmental change and the rise and fall of the earliest civilizations in South Asia. The collaborative Land, Water and Settlement project is integrating geographical and archaeological field research and analysis to reconstruct the transforming cultural and environmental landscape of northwest India in the critical period between 2000 and 300 BC. This period was when the courses of a number of major rivers are believed to have shifted, the project investigating whether geographical or climatic change actually took place, and aims to provide insight into how and why past South Asian societies responded to environmental threats and changes.

Perfect storms: Dark Ages compared

Poul Holm (Trinity College Dublin: holmp@tcd.ie)

'Crisis' and 'Continuity' are two of the most frequently used concepts in the historian's toolbox, and the interpretation of the fifth-sixth centuries in Europe – and indeed many other periods in world history – hinges on the historian's preference for one or the other concept. However, mainstream historians are often loath to model explicitly their explanatory framework which makes comparative or world history difficult. I welcome the opportunity at this seminar to try out some thoughts.

I propose an interpretative framework for global comparison of the sudden demise of complex social systems. Instead of the contentious words 'collapses' and 'dark ages', I prefer the vocabulary of ecosystems theory. A regime shift (or "collapse") happens when a controlling structural element – typically a top predator – is removed from the system; cascading effects will occur; and eventually a new regime will be in place, typically at a lower level of complexity. In the words of Niklas Luhmann, who developed a "systems theory" for the social sciences, the structure may change but the function of the system remains, namely to produce 'society'.

The implications are:

- A complex or higher-order system must be in place.
- One or several controlling structural elements are changed or obliterated. I believe that controlling structural elements must concern central beliefs or core values of a society and its social, economic and cultural institutions. Dramatic demographic or environmental factors may have a decisive impact on the controlling structures.

- 'Regime shift' implies a structural break down of a higher-order system happening within a short time; following a regime shift a black-box series of events leads to a 'reordering' of society (often at a lower order) within an extended period of time.
- Reordering may produce surprising evidence of 'resilience' – but resilience should not be interpreted to the effect that no collapse happened anyway. Furthermore, resilience is not simply a question of conservative forces – societies depend on their ability to interpret and adapt to the challenges of the human and natural environment and 'innovation' is therefore part and parcel of resilience.
- Similarly 'cascading effects' may happen that continue through an extended period of time, deepening the effects of structural change. Cascades should not be mistaken for the Regime Shift.

In my talk I shall try to elucidate how these concepts may be used as a comparative framework and ask the question if the early medieval Dark Ages were the Perfect Storm of regime shifts.

The end of Roman Britain and the anatomy of a crisis

Martin Millett (University of Cambridge: mjm62@cam.ac.uk) and James Gerrard (University of Cambridge: jfg35@cam.ac.uk)

'The greatest, perhaps, and most awful scene in the history of mankind'

With these words Gibbon described the Fall of the Roman Empire. Whether one agrees with the sentiment or not it seems clear that the fifth century was a time of crisis in Europe. However, we still struggle to understand the process that underpinned the fifth-century crisis and subsequent imperial collapse. Part of the problem is the concept of the 'Roman Empire', which is often portrayed as monolithic and unchanging. This paper argues that 'Roman' was itself a problematic category and that Roman Britain should be seen as regionally variable and constantly evolving. This is a prerequisite for approaching the fifth century crisis.

This emphasis on regional diversity allows us to explore the evidence for widespread change that supports the notion of fundamental crisis. This crisis and the ways in which societies responded to it allows us to reject the notion of collapse and replace it with a more compelling and intellectually satisfying narrative.

Attila and the recast of Scandinavia

Lotte Hedeager (University of Oslo: lotte.hedeager@iakh.uio.no)

For two generations of the fifth century AD the inhabitants of most of Europe shared a common experience: the Huns. The importance of this painful historical event that accompanied the end of the Roman Period and recast the European political landscape needs to be emphasised, because the contemporary sources tend to favour the 'imperial' Germanic peoples in the former West-Roman Empire who survived to write their history. The Huns themselves disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared, in the mid-fifth century AD, leaving only sparse physical traces behind. If events are defined as 'happenings that transform structures by disarticulating and rearticulating the schemas and resources of which structures are composed', thus the meeting with the Huns became such an event of universal dimensions to the Scandinavians. It institutionalized the comitatus-system and a new hierarchical order, it recast Norse mythology and kingship for centuries to come, and it came to represent a powerful Northern counterforce to the victorious Christian regimes to the south. To understand such thoroughgoing and rapid transformations demands however different conceptual tools and archaeological methods to those we normally employ when studying long-term history. In this paper I will focus on the nature of 'event' as a processual phenomenon in the *longue durée* of Northern Europe.

What, where, when: Collapse in Viking Age Europe?

James Barrett (University of Cambridge: jhb41@cam.ac.uk)

The correlates of the Scandinavian diaspora of the 'long 9th century' were not trivial. The kingdoms of Anglo-Saxon England were conquered. The linguistic, cultural and political landscape of Scotland was changed fundamentally. New forms of settlement were established in Ireland, around the nuclei of military encampments. The Carolingian empire was fractured by civil war. Interpretations of the causal links between these phenomena, and of their long-term implications, vary along a continuum from the ephemeral to the fundamental. Using a comparative perspective, this paper attempts to illuminate the reasons behind these differing interpretations – often based on different regions, decades and sources. In concluding, it addresses the complex problem of whether or not Western Europe collapsed in the Viking Age.

The Long 14th Century - A review

John Hatcher (University of Cambridge: mjh1001@cam.ac.uk)

I will attempt a review of recent work on the crises of the 14th century, focussing in particular on the papers and discussions of the workshop held in May. In the last twenty years or so there has been a transformation in the way in which historians have judged the agrarian crises of 1315-22 and the Black Death of 1345-53 and the devastating epidemics that followed in its wake. Now there is much more willingness to acknowledge the huge scale of these disasters and that they may have changed the course of history. Causality, however, remains contentious. Over recent years increasing weight has been given to environmental factors and climate change at the expense of human agency, but the possibility is now being explored that it was the combination of a wide range of factors that produced the crises, and that social and economic developments played a major part in their unprecedented scale. Somewhat neglected, but worthy of far more attention than it has so far received, is the remarkable ability of society to survive these immense blows without collapse.

Crises of inequality in Maori prehistory and tradition.

Atholl Anderson (Australian National University: atholl.anderson@anu.edu.au)

East Polynesian migration to New Zealand brought not just the first human population but a social system founded on the comprehensive inequality of mana (status or preference). Over the course of prehistory and into the early nineteenth century Maori status societies, confronting inherent and anthropogenic inequalities in New Zealand's biogeography, coupled with climatic and demographic change, reacted in pulses of internal migration, endemic feuding and later intensified warfare. Evidence from palaeoenvironmental, archaeological and, especially, traditional sources, is discussed in reference to the recurrent crises.

The collapse of Nasca on the South Coast of Peru: View from new perspectives

David Beresford-Jones (University of Cambridge: dgb27@cam.ac.uk)

Ideas of 'collapse' have pervaded archaeological interpretations worldwide, but perhaps nowhere more so than in one of humanity's rare independent hearths of agriculture and 'pristine' civilization – the Central Andes. Here, culture change has long been explained by a model of 'punctuated equilibrium', driven by the pulse of El Niño climatic perturbations. And as elsewhere, archaeologists have often glossed over considerable uncertainties in resolving climatic variations for particular times and places from the high-resolution ice-core

records of distant Andean glaciers.

This paper concerns the case of Nasca, which flourished along the riparian oases in the hyperarid south coast of Peru, until c. AD 500. I present research that does indeed find evidence of major El Niño flood events at around the time of Nasca's collapse and fragmentation. But it also uncovers a sequence of more gradual, human-induced events that underlie this supposedly catastrophic collapse: in particular, the clearance of huarango (*Prosopis limensis*) woodland to make way for maize, cotton and other crops. I present evidence for the coastal valleys of southern Peru having remained densely forested well into the Nasca Period, attenuating the impact of El Niño events and supporting hitherto underappreciated agroforestry adaptations. Gradual deforestation eventually breached an environmental threshold, however, dramatically increasing river and wind erosion, and precipitating radical desertification. Moreover, this gradual process fed back into, and culminated in, the subsequent Middle Horizon (c. AD 750), a period of marked cultural change on the south coast.

I close by considering one further dataset that offers us potential insight into the nature and magnitude of Nasca's 'collapse'. For alongside archaeology, another, independent record of the Andean past is to be had from the discipline of historical linguistics, which in the Central Andes is defined largely by the to-and-fro of two major language families. Most Andean linguists place the original heartland of Aymara on the south coast of Peru. Yet even before the Incas, it had largely been eclipsed here by Quechua. When did this critical turning point in linguistic prehistory occur, and why? Might this too be a facet, or consequence, of Nasca's 'collapse' and the Wari expansion that succeeded it?

Abandoning collapse in the history of the Hohokam of Southern Arizona.

Randall H. McGuire (Binghamton University: rmcguire@binghamton.edu)

Western scholars have long discussed civilizations in terms of their rise and their collapse. Archaeologists have focused on the rise and the fall of cultures as the primary events of change they wish to explain. The image of collapsing civilizations incorporates a number of assumptions and value judgments that scholars rarely examine. Collapse assumes that civilizations exist as unitary phenomena that can be evaluated and understood at a single scale of analysis and in terms of qualitative transformations. Collapse values civilizations as positive and mourns their demise as negative. Collapse implies a finite and definitive end to cultures. I would suggest that we need to examine these assumptions and critique these values in order to arrive at a more nuanced and relational understanding of transformative change in the ancient past. This examination involves questioning how we relate quantitative and qualitative change, who benefits and who suffers in cultural change, how these relationships change as we alter the scale of our analysis and how our western notions of collapse and abandonment blind us to alternative relationships to the past. I will ground my analysis in an examination of the Hohokam Culture of southern Arizona, USA. The Hohokam Culture thrived from AD 300 to AD 1450. Although no one would describe it as a civilization, it did experience periods of expansion, transformative change, and what many archaeologists have called a collapse.

'Maya Collapse': What Crisis? Whose Collapse?

Elizabeth Graham (University College London: e.graham@ucl.ac.uk)

Identifying a phenomenon of 'collapse' is connected not only to the detection of discontinuity in aspects of material culture but to what appear to be genuine losses or disappearances of material culture that had previously defined a civilization. Where there is discontinuity, we need to ask, What happened and who is responsible? Where there are claims of loss or disappearance, we need to ask by what measures have we determined 'disappearance'. I focus on the specific case of the Maya collapse and discuss what the Spanish conquest and its repercussions can tell us about the nature of discontinuity in the material record, and what methodological problems exist, but tend to be ignored, in determining collapse from disappearance.

Selected Restaurants and Pubs in Cambridge

RESTAURANTS

Browns - Trumpington Street

Opening hours: Food is served Monday to Saturday, noon-11pm

Loch Fyne - 37 Trumpington Street

Opening hours: Mon-Thurs, 9am to 10pm; Fri, 9am to 10.30pm; Sat, 10am to 11pm.

Crowne Plaza - Downing Street (opposite Downing Site)

This Crowne Plaza has restaurant and bar: reliable and convenient – opposite the conference venue

Anchor - Silver Street

Open: 11:00 to 23:00

Bella Italia - The Mill, Newnham Road

Open until 23:00

Bangkok City – 24 Green Street

Evening opening hours: 18:00 to 23:00

Café Rouge - 24-26 Bridge Street

Opening hours: 9:00 to 23:00

Varsity Restaurant - 35 St Andrew's St,

Opening hours: 12:00 to 14:30, 17:30 to 23:00

Chez Gérard - 27-28 Bridge Street

Opening hours: 12:00 to 22:30 (Sunday-Thursday), 12:00 to 23:00 (Friday-Saturday)

Dojo (Chinese/Japanese/Thai/Vietnamese) - 1-2 Millers Yard

Tel: 01223 363471

Opening hours: Mon - Thu 12:00 - 14:30 17:30 - 23:00 Fri 12:00 - 16:00 17:30 - 23:00 Sat - Sun 12:00 - 23:00

Ha! Ha!@The Blue Boar - 17 Trinity Street

Opening hours: Mon - Fri 11:00 - 23:00 Sat 10:00 - 23:00.

Pizza Express - Jesus Lane

Opening hours: 11:30 - 23:30

Pizza Express – Regent Street

Pizza Express – St Andrew's Street

PUBS

The Slug and Lettuce - 34-35 Green Street

The Anchor - Silver St, overlooking the river: on the way back to Selwyn College

The Bath House - 3 Benet St

The Eagle - 8 Benet St (the classic Cambridge pub, very popular and frequently very busy)


The Mill - 14 Mill Lane, near the river

The Cow - Corn Exchange St

University and City Centre Map



The McDonald Institute is located in Downing site and is accessible from the Downing St entrance



Other Useful Information

Taxis: 01223 561120; 01223 525555; 01223 462020

National Rail Enquiries: 08457 48 49 50